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THE TROUBLE WITH POSTMODERN ZEAL
MONROE H. FREEDMAN*
I have always admired the adversarial advocacy with which
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow attacks adversarial advocacy.
Also, given her postmodern skepticism that there can be any
certainty in truth, I respect her certainty about her own version
of truth. She exhibits both of these qualities in her Article, The
Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicul-
tural World.'
I premise my own system of lawyers' ethics on individual
dignity and autonomy.2 Accordingly, I believe that people should
be able to choose how to resolve their disputes. It is possible,
therefore, that I have no disagreement with Professor Menkel-
Meadow. If she means only that parties to a dispute should be
allowed to use whatever nonviolent means they choose, we are
in complete accord. In fact, though, such choice is widely avail-
able. I assume, therefore, that Professor Menkel-Meadow calls
for displacement of the adversary system with some institution-
alized alternative(s).3
* Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Hofstra University Law
School. Author, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (Matthew Bender, 1990). I had the
benefit of hearing N.Y. Supreme Court Justice Phyllis Gangel-Jacob's comments on the
same paper at the Hofstra Law School Conference on Legal Ethics: The Core Issues,
March 10-12, 1996 (but I do not speak for Judge Gangel-Jacob).
1. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmod-
ern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). Professor Menkel-
Meadow presented substantially the same paper at the Hofstra Law School Confer-
ence on Legal Ethics: The Core Issues, March 10-12, 1996.
2. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 6-10, 13-
17, 43-64 (1990).
3. As she says:
[T]he adversary system may no longer be the best way for our legal
system to deal with all of the matters that come within its purview....
[Olur epistemology has sufficiently changed in this era of poststructural,
postmodern knowledge so that we need to reexamine the attributes of the
adversary system as the 'ideal type' of a: legal system, and also reexam-
ine the practice based on the premises of that system.
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To understand Professor Menkel-Meadow's "postmodern" criti-
cisms of the adversary system, one must understand what she
means by postmodernism. In her own words: "If late-twentieth-
century learning has taught us anything it is that truth is illu-
sive, partial, interpretable, dependent on the characteristics of
the knowers as well as the known, and, most importantly, com-
plex."" She also believes that we have recently learned that "ev-
ery 'text' has its ambiguity, its negation, its opposition, its 'si-
lence'."5 From this she concludes that the "epistemological sys-
tem" upon which the adversary system is premised is "crumbling
as we speak."6 She implies that those who wrote the Bill of
Rights, which constitutionalized the adversary system,7 would
never have done so if only they had had the advantage of this
postmodern enlightenment.
As these quotes show, Professor Menkel-Meadow's analysis
ignores history, including the history of philosophy. The notion of
truth's illusiveness would not have surprised the British empiri-
cists of two and three centuries ago.' Plato, earlier than 300 B.C.,
held that we can capture only the "meaningless illusion" of reali-
ty.9 Further, for two millennia, textual ambiguity has been mani-
fest to anyone who has observed how Roman Catholics, Eastern
Orthodox, and a multitude of Protestant sects have given radical-
ly different meanings to the same gospel truths. As Shakespeare
noted four centuries before the discoveries of postmodernism,
even "[tihe devil can cite Scripture for his purpose." °
It is not surprising, therefore, that those who devised the ad-
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 5.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 20.
6. Id. at 44.
7. See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 13-26.
8. Cf. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 866 (5th ed. 1993) ("According to the empir-
icist, all ideas are derived from experience; therefore, knowledge of the physical
world can be nothing more than a generalization from particular instances and can
never reach more than a high degree of probability.").
I happen to know more than I ever wanted to know about the British Empiri-
cists, having taken a course bearing that title in my first year of college. I selected
the course because I thought it was going to be about British imperialists.
9. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 229 (Francis M. Cornford trans., 1945).
10. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, sc. 3, line 93 (J.P.
Brown ed., 1955) (1600); cf Matthew 4:6.
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versary system took account of the illusive nature of
truth-particularly the elusive kind of truth that is sought in
resolving a dispute between two or more contesting parties. A
scientist, searching for a cure for cancer, will know when she
has found it. But when each of two parties blames the other for
an automobile accident (with one perhaps also blaming the man-
ufacturer of the car and/or a repair shop), truth can be known
only in degrees of probability. Also, interests and biases of the
parties and their witnesses, and even of the fact finder(s), can
complicate the search for truth. In the end, we rarely will know
for certain that we have found the truth. The adversary system
was designed in substantial part to deal with precisely this sort
of elusiveness and uncertainty." Indeed, as noted in the New
York Times, even scientists are learning the importance of ad-
versarial "checks and balances" to "control subjectivity." 2
Demonstrating her adversarial skills, Professor Menkel-Mead-
ow uses the familiar stratagem of shifting the burden of proof.3
Note how cleverly she does it: "For those who cleave to the ad-
versary system [here citing Freedman, Understanding Lawyers'
Ethics], I want to shift the burden of proof for them to convince
us that the adversary system continues to do its job better than
other methods we might use [here citing nothing]." 14 In addition
to shifting the burden, Professor Menkel-Meadow imposes on
her opponents a burden to "convince" (not simply to persuade)
11. See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 28-39 for a discussion of this point.
12. John N. Wilford, Customs Check: Leave Your Ideological Baggage Behind, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1983, at 8E (quoted in FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 35).
Something interesting happened at the William & Mary conference. Shortly
before Professor Menkel-Meadow's talk, I told her that I was going to be "very
mean" in my comments on her paper. At least three people who had heard Professor
Menkel-Meadow give a very similar paper at Hofstra Law School noted that Profes-
sor Menkel-Meadow was considerably less confrontational and dogmatic in her talk
at William & Mary than she had been two weeks earlier at Hofstra. One could
draw an inference that awareness of an adversarial response caused the speaker to
present her views in a less adversarial manner. See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 33
("[Tihe opponent of an adversarial lawyer transmits more facts that are unfavorable
to her own client. Apparently, awareness that one has an adversarial counterpart. is
a significant inducement to candor." (citing results of a study published in E. Allen
Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary
Proceedings, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1136 (1993))).
13. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 6.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
1996]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
everyone else that the adversary system does its job better than
other systems. 5
Professor Menkel-Meadow also suggests that I have never
attempted to defend the adversary system. 6 In fact, however, I
accepted her challenge at least six years before she issued it. In
Understanding Lawyers' Ethics I noted that "[in recent years,
attacks upon the adversary system have been unprecedented in
their breadth and intensity," 7 and that "the adversary system
has become a battleground on which fundamental issues of
lawyers' ethics are being fought out."8 Accordingly, I devote
Chapter 2 of the book to explaining and justifying the adversary
system. Here are the topic headings in that chapter:
Criticisms of the Adversary System
The Adversary System and Individual Dignity
The Adversary System and Individual Rights
The False Metaphor of Warfare
The Adversary System in Civil Litigation
The Civil Trial and the Constitution
The Jury as an Aspect of the Adversary System
The Search for an Alternative System
Effectiveness in the Search for Truth
The Flawed Analogy to Non-Litigation Settings
A Paradigm of the Inquisitorial Search for Truth
The Sense of Having Been Treated Fairly
The Problem of Socio-Economic Unfairness."
Professor Menkel-Meadow may find the analysis in that chapter
unpersuasive (and, if so, she might explain why), but she chose
instead to omit any citation to it.
Somewhat more subtly, Professor Menkel-Meadow demands
that we demonstrate the superiority of the adversary system to
all other methods that might be used 2 -although omitting to
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 14.
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 13-42.
20. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 6.
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specify what those methods are. I do not mind shooting at a
moving target, but Professor Menkel-Meadow, as a "postmodern,
multicultural thinker,"2 is at pains to present no target at all.
As she says:
After I critique the adversary system, you will wonder
what I would substitute for it. It should be obvious that as a
postmodern, multicultural thinker I have no one panacea,
solution, or process to offer-instead, I think we should con-
template a variety of different ways to structure process in
our legal system to reflect our multiple goals and objec-
tives.'
Indeed, she acknowledges that "[s]ome of the postmodern at-
tacks on knowledge would reject any legal system" at all."
Professor Menkel-Meadow does "envision" a "greater multi-
plicity of stories [or narratives] being told, of more open, partici-
patory and democratic processes, yielding truths that are con-
crete but contextualized, explicitly focused on who finds 'truth'
for whose benefit."24 As I suggested at the outset, if people
want to narrate at each other, they should be free to do so. I
wonder, however, what it means to resolve a dispute by inviting
an open, participatory multiplicity of narratives. One can only
imagine. Because Professor Menkel-Meadow has referred to the
O.J. Simpson trial,25 consider whether resolution of that dis-
pute would have been improved if it had been opened up to the
narratives of the members of Nicole Brown's family, Ron
Goldman's family, Kato Kaelin (whose testimony was limited by
rules of evidence to several days), and Faye Resnick (who, re-
portedly, was all too willing to narrate to the world). Indeed, we
easily could have had a multiplicity of narratives from half of
Los Angeles.
21. Id. at 11.
22. Id. at 11-12.
23. Id. at 16 n.54. Among other unexplained suggestions, Professor Menkel-Mead-
ow urges us to become "lawyers for the situation." Id. at 43. On the emptiness of
this phrase, see Monroe H. Freedman, Brandeis' Lawyer for the Situation, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at 21.
24. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 23-24.
25. Id. at 8 n.14, 9 n.17.
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One reason I remain skeptical about alternative dispute reso-
lution (ADR) is that it received its lift-off during the 1960s and
early 1970s, coinciding with the opening of access to the legal
system to people who earlier had been virtually exclud-
ed-people like tenants, consumers, poor people, and others who
are similarly disadvantaged. ADR seems to be an effort, there-
fore, on the part of some, to shunt these downtrodden people
aside once again. Moreover, according to my anecdotal evidence,
those who most strongly favor ADR do not, themselves, rely on
it when they have something important at stake.
For example, a good friend, who fervently advocates the use of
ADR, came to me a few years ago. He wanted my help in finding
the toughest litigator in New York to handle a difficult and
complex case. He did not consider ADR as an option for himself.
Even Professor Menkel-Meadow admits that in three recent
disputes, in all of which she was both plaintiff and counsel, she
resorted to old-fashioned litigation. 6 Characteristically, howev-
er, Professor Menkel-Meadow does not present this admission as
an admission. Rather, in good adversarial style, she argues it to
prove that she is not "an ADR romanticist" 27-- that is, to per-
suade the reader that she is free of any bias on the issue. She
fails to discuss, however, how and why the adversary system
proved more desirable to her in the roles of plaintiff and counsel.
Finally, what does all this have to do with teaching profes-
sional responsibility-the subject of this conference? Professor
Menkel-Meadow tells us that she no longer teaches trial advoca-
cy.2" If she is merely relating her personal teaching preference,
we may, again, have nothing to disagree about. Certainly choos-
ing not to teach trial advocacy is her prerogative. Professor
Menkel-Meadow's point, however, may be that law schools
should not teach trial advocacy at all, or that law schools should
omit instruction in what she calls the "dragon"-like ethic of
zeal.2" Such an omission would, I believe, seriously disserve our
students and their future clients.30
26. Id. at 33 n.134.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 41 n.170.
29. Id. at 41. For a different view of the ethic of zeal, see FREEDMAN, supra note
2, at 65-86 ("Zealous Representation: The Pervasive Ethic").
30. See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 65-86 ("Zealous Representation: The Pervasive
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I have litigated a variety of cases involving civil liberties and
civil rights-litigation on behalf of minority groups, political
dissidents, institutionalized children, victims of police brutality,
and lawyers representing unpopular clients and causes. My
adversaries were powerful, skillful, and intractable. In quite a
few cases I was able to negotiate amicable settlements that
satisfied my clients. Such successful negotiation never happened,
however, until my clients could, figuratively, push the other side
up against a wall, making it clear that we could hold them there
until they decided to discuss the matter amicably. Unquestion-
ably, law schools should, and do, teach negotiating skills.3' But
after a serious dispute has arisen it is always better to negotiate
from a position of strength. Teaching future lawyers any other
lesson would be educational malpractice.
In sum, although I do not admire the ideas that Professor
Menkel-Meadow presents in her paper, I continue to admire her
formidable skills as a zealous advocate. I suspect that I will see
more evidence of those skills in the future. 2
Ethic").
31. See, e.g., HoFSTRA UNIVERSITY, HOFSTRA LAW 42, 46 (describing courses enti-
tled "Alternatives to Litigation" and "Dispute Settlement"); James E. Moliterno, Legal
Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 107-10 (1996) (describing William & Mary's Legal Skills program, which
teaches negotiation skills in the context of simulated client service).
32. Another participant at the William & Mary conference told me that after my
comments on her paper, Professor Menkel-Meadow remarked that she would have to
add a discussion of "testosterone and the adversary system." If the report is true,
her remark was below the belt.
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